Elite dating service in Xiangtan China

The most controversial of these dating services is Luxy, which touts itself as a “​millionaires' matchmaker” but described itself when it launched.
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This abundance of choice has become a headache for many single people and has ultimately spawned a new breed of dating app: elite platforms unashamedly catering to professionals, the wealthy, the highly educated and celebrities. Luxy declined to provide figures on its profits or revenues, but Krause says it has been profitable since its first year of operation and now has more than 2m users. Those who apply to be accepted on to the app, which is free at the basic level, must first pass a hour process where they are vetted by existing members.

But he dismisses concerns about elitism. But many people wish to find an equally successful partner. Luxy is serving these needs by providing the platform.


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Why not a dating app for successful people? David Vermeulen, its co-founder, says the idea for the platform came to him six years ago when he was single after spending a depressing evening trawling through dating websites. The sites were uninspiring, he had little in common with the dating profiles he came across and many of the women lived far away. So he decided to launch something different. The Inner Circle is a cross between a dating app and an events company. It organises social gatherings for its members, such as polo tournaments, gallery openings or cabaret nights.

It also has an app where users can organise dates and view the restaurant or holiday recommendations put forward by other members. Members are vetted according to a range of criteria, including profession, age and the quality of the pictures they submit. What we do is link people who are serious about dating. I encourage a diverse community, different kinds of people. In Amsterdam it is not considered elitist — it is just another dating app that people use. The League, launched in the US in , caters to professionals who are screened based on what industry they work in, their university education and how many LinkedIn connections they have.

Keep them that way. It promises that its algorithm ensures members will never come across LinkedIn contacts, Facebook friends or colleagues while browsing for potential matches — a level of privacy likely to appeal to business professionals looking to keep their work and personal life separate. A London-based financier, who met his girlfriend on The League a year ago, concedes he had qualms about using it initially. Essentially I found love. Toffee, a dating app exclusively aimed at the privately educated, launched in the UK this year. Expansion plans are already under way in India and Nigeria, where a significant proportion of the population is privately educated.

To further clarify how concurrent appointments affect political and economic outcomes for different classes of cities and to begin shedding light on the causal mechanisms at work, this section examines the cases of Zhuhai Guangdong , Ganzhou Jiangxi , and Xiangyang Hubei , drawing on a combination of Chinese media reports, secondary literature, and evidence from interviews. The specific cases of Zhuhai, Ganzhou, and Xiangyang are selected for two main reasons. First, they represent different classes of cities: Zhuhai is a relatively wealthy coastal city a rich city , Ganzhou is a former revolutionary base area a red city , and Xiangyang, a minor inland industrial center, is neither.

Second, these cities exhibit variation over time in concurrent PPSC appointments, enabling before-and-after comparisons. These cases provide qualitative evidence of both the circumstances and effects of concurrent appointments. They also illustrate the distinct dynamics of concession, compromise, and co-optation, as seen in Fig.

Concurrent appointment effects in Zhuhai, Xiangyang, and Ganzhou. These values are calculated using data for the period — The case of Zhuhai city in Guangdong province approximates the idea of concurrent appointments as concession , whereby the leaders of localities with particular clout or importance gain PPSC seats and use this perch to promote local interests. Although the leadership tenures of Liang and Li differed in some respects, both periods saw Zhuhai capture local economic benefits and launch high-profile policy initiatives that reflected some degree of autonomy.

As Fig. Though small in population terms and outshined by leading Guangdong cities like Guangzhou and Shenzhen, Zhuhai has had outsize economic and geographic importance during the reform era. Between the mid s and the early s, Liang had served in Zhuhai, holding the post of deputy party secretary and mayor.

During the mids, Liang showed that he was unafraid to pursue developmental mega-projects even when provincial support was lacking. Liang promoted construction of a new Zhuhai-Guangzhou rail line in hopes that such a link would stimulate local economic growth.

After being stonewalled by top provincial leaders in , Liang made a political end run around them, seeking central support for the project Xu and Yeh That year, Li Jia, who had risen through the ranks in another Guangdong locality, was installed as Zhuhai party secretary and also obtained a concurrent PPSC seat. This local boosterism paid dividends.

Like the SEZ status granted three decades earlier, the FTZ designation was a major political achievement for a small city and promised big economic benefits. As Ngo et al. In sum, the case of Zhuhai illustrates how PPSC representation for wealthy cities can function as a concession, further strengthening localities in both economic and political terms. The tenures of Liang Guangda and Li Jia saw Zhuhai engage in bold efforts to promote local development. The city managed to raise its national profile and capture major economic benefits during these years, sometimes to the chagrin of a provincial government with other priorities.

These periods contrast with the relative decline Zhuhai experienced in economic terms and in its public profile during the s, when the city lacked a PPSC seat. If the case of Zhuhai illustrates concession, the case of Ganzhou resembles what we call compromise , whereby concurrent appointments enhance local autonomy but do not yield clear economic benefits.

Under both Pan and Shi, Ganzhou launched major policy initiatives to put a historically important region back on the map. However, greater local autonomy complicated relations with provincial authorities, limiting economic benefits.

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Ganzhou is a mountainous prefectural-level city in southern Jiangxi. Due to its rugged topography and distinctive Hakka sub-culture, Ganzhou has never been tightly integrated with the wealthier northern half of Jiangxi. Despite its Communist legacy, Ganzhou remained predominantly rural and underdeveloped as it entered the twenty-first century.

When Ganzhou was tasked by the province with building a new Ganzhou-Dingnan Expressway to link Jiangxi with Guangdong, for example, the municipal leadership gave high priority to this task Jingji ribao More broadly, the city leadership emphasized building up its urban-industrial economy.

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Pan spearheaded a large-scale campaign to rebuild rural settlements and restructure rural governance, drawing attention from national-level leaders and media in the process. This rural development campaign differed in tone from the pro-urban, pro-industrial strategy of the provincial leadership. While Pan did not necessarily defy provincial leaders, his initiative in some ways upstaged them Jaros After his arrival in Ganzhou, Shi launched a publicity blitz to highlight rural poverty in Ganzhou, and appealed for greater central funding to support development in the former Jiangxi Soviet area Ibid.

The Central Policy Document No. According to a local journalist familiar with the origins of this initiative, the provincial level played at most a secondary role in lobbying for these special policies for Ganzhou Interview NCb ; Jaros In short, the case of Ganzhou reflects the dynamic we call compromise. After , Ganzhou displayed a high degree of policymaking activism under concurrently appointed leaders Pan and Shi. Despite locally driven policy initiatives that attracted national attention, however, Ganzhou did not achieve above-average economic performance as compared with Jiangxi more broadly see Fig.

This may be because local activism complicated relations between Ganzhou and provincial leaders, limiting the amount of support from the provincial level. In contrast with the experiences of Zhuhai and Ganzhou, the case of Xiangyang in Hubei province illustrates what we call co - optation , whereby a represented locality gains material benefits but is expected to follow higher-level priorities.

Xiangyang, called Xiangfan prior to , is a medium-sized industrial city in northwest Hubei. In recent decades, Xiangyang has lagged increasingly far behind Wuhan, the provincial capital, in population and economic size. This regional imbalance within Hubei became a growing concern for policymakers after the mids, prompting new development approaches. While promoting economic upgrading in Wuhan, the strategy also named Yichang and Xiangyang as growth poles for the less-developed western part of the province.

In addition to policy measures to stimulate growth in Xiangyang and Yichang, Hubei also used political mechanisms. Indeed, this interpretation is borne out by patterns of economic development and media coverage in Xiangyang.

Introduction

The concurrent appointments of a subset of local leaders to higher-level political bodies in Leninist systems like China raise fundamental questions about the extent of top-down political control and bottom-up interest articulation in such systems. In this paper, we have attempted to clarify the function of concurrent leadership appointments in China by applying a novel conceptual framework and exploiting rich evidence from the subnational level.

Rather, concurrent appointments benefit local interests at least as much as provincial-level interests. While empirical evidence suggests that different intergovernmental dynamics apply to different types of cities, the patterns we document resemble what we call co - optation , compromise , and concession rather than control.

Quantitative analysis of how concurrent appointments affect local policy autonomy and economic outcomes indicates that represented localities enjoy benefits.


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    • They also display higher rates of GDP growth and higher levels of investment, suggesting that PPSC representation helps localities capture more economic opportunities. However, the consequences of concurrent appointments vary for different types of cities.

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    For other cities, the effects of concurrent appointment are less consistent. Qualitative evidence from the cases of Zhuhai, Ganzhou, and Xiangyang reinforces our quantitative findings while adding more texture to the analysis. Zhuhai, a wealthy coastal city that enjoyed heightened policy autonomy and economic benefits under concurrently appointed leaders, illustrates a concession dynamic. The case of Ganzhou, a city with a renowned revolutionary legacy, reflects a compromise dynamic whereby concurrent appointments bring more local autonomy but less-obvious economic benefits.

    For Xiangyang, a medium-sized industrial city, concurrent appointments were a form of co-optation, bringing economic benefits but also pressure to execute higher-level policy priorities. While the timing and consequences of concurrent appointments differed widely across the three cases, however, each city appears to have gained more than it lost, whether in the form of expanded policymaking autonomy or additional economic opportunities.

    Although our case studies and quantitative analysis do not fully resolve the question of whether it is the institutional arrangements or individual leaders put in place through concurrent appointments that drive city-level outcomes, there is preliminary support for an institutional interpretation.

    These subnational findings from China imply that concurrent leadership appointments may benefit rather than constrain local interests at other levels of politics in China and in other Leninist systems. When local leaders concurrently sit on higher-level political bodies, their jurisdictions have a greater voice in higher-level deliberations and may benefit in more tangible ways as well. At the national level in China, the examples of Chen Liangyu and Bo Xilai, provincial leaders who held concurrent Politburo seats, show that even actors integrated into the elite level of national politics may prioritize local interests or personal ambitions over higher-level agendas.

    From the standpoint of localities, then, the benefits of access to the central leadership often outweigh the closer oversight that comes with such ties.


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      • The analysis here provides further evidence of the dynamics of bargaining, reciprocity, and mutual dependency in intergovernmental relations highlighted in previous work by Li , Zheng , Chung , and others. As we show here, not only are some cities singled out for concurrent leaderships appointments; the implicit privileges and obligations that accompany PPSC representation also vary by city type. Because the leaders of such cities are typically deputy-provincial cadres by default, concurrent appointment to PPSCs does not require a change of rank.

      Since , the Chinese government has actively promoted tourism in revolutionary base areas. Although we use red tourism status as a proxy for political importance, we do not see tourism itself as what makes these cities important. This assumes that the error is not correlated with any of the independent variables, which we think is a valid assumption based on the data validation exercise. Correlations between revenue as a share of GDP, GDP levels, per capita GDP levels, and GDP growth are all very weak, indicating the importance of extraction effort in determining this variable, rather than just increases in economic output.

      These cities have concurrent leadership appointments as a rule, and thus offer no variation over time. This approach also controls for the possibility that the included control variables have disparate effects in different city types. Note that although we use red tourism as a proxy for political importance, we do not see tourism itself as important. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern. Theoretically, however, it is also possible that while many leaders hope to distinguish themselves through achievements on the job and thereby improve their chances of promotion, many are not prepared to accept the political risks that accompany high-profile gambits.

      Young leaders on the fast-track might have less incentive than others to innovate if they are already advancing through the ranks. Biographical data for all prefecture-level leaders over this time period, including unique prefecture-level leaders, comes from Blum, Jurgen, David Bulman, Xun Yan, and Qiong Zhang. Based on a preliminary analysis using the case-study localities, we find a range of career backgrounds and promotion trajectories for concurrently appointed city leaders. Although some concurrent appointees, such as Pan Yiyang and Li Jia, have career backgrounds in the Communist Youth League regarded by some analysts as the base of a large elite political faction , most city-level leaders have no readily discernable factional alignment.

      Although future work may be able to systematically examine how the factional positioning of city-level leaders affect city performance, data limitations and underdeveloped theory on subnational factionalism make this task difficult. Meanwhile, concurrent appointees in the case-study cities have widely varying career trajectories. Some leaders, such as Shi Wenqing, have risen slowly and steadily through the ranks, while other leaders, such as Fan Ruiping, have progressed more quickly to higher official posts.