Dating anyone in Hangzhou China

A dating and pick up guide for Hangzhou helping you meet girls at clubs, we will start this guide, just like we have with all of our other China dating guides. you don't want to show up to a new city and not know anyone.
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Foreign major players, like Tinder and Bumble, are not nearly as popular in the country and have fallen far behind local competitors. This video-based speed matchmaking app , developed by Beijing Milian Technology in , gained substantial traction in the second half of , specifically targeting singles in lower-tier cities. Originally launched as a Tinder-like and text-only Chinese dating app, Yidui failed to attract people in its focused market, the company founder Ren Zhe said during an interview with local tech media 36Kr.

These online matchmakers mainly function as ice-breakers, helping lubricate the conversation. Specific figures for both investing rounds were not provided. The app differentiates itself from other Chinese dating apps by providing a livestreaming feature, which allows users to start or join a video chat room, in the presence of a matchmaker. Matchmakers look for potential matches for clients and host video dating to facilitate relationship building. The app hopes the video-first approach can reduce the number of fake photos and bots on the platform, which is a persistent problem for dating apps.

Besides joining livestreaming chats hosted by matchmakers, u sers can also choose whom to chat by following them after scrolling through an algorithmic list of recommendations. Its service adopts a freemium model. With a premium account, which costs RMB 30 USD 4 monthly, users can enjoy features including checking read status and browsing who has visited his or her profile.


It was available again a couple of months later. Tantan is extremely similar to Tinder, which is based around uploading photos and swiping on other users. The app also provides some ice-breakers. Momo, launched in , has evolved from a simple location-based dating app to a general social platform that, in addition to its original features, also includes group chats, livestreaming, short-video, and casual games.

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The compa ny went public on Nasdaq in December , the first and only Chinese dating app to do so, three years after its founding, with nearly 70 million monthly active users. After registering with their personal information, users are able to follow others nearby and send private messages to people you want to know. There are sections for audio and video livestreaming in different categories, including music, outdoors, talk shows, and gaming. Users can send virtual gifts to streamers, traded through Momo coin seven Momo coins equal one yuan.

The platform offers a couple of hyper-casual games as well. It matches users based on a personality test, targeting young users.

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The app, like many other dating apps in China, underwent a wave of strict regulation in but made a comeback after clean-ups. Ma became interested in the English language as a young boy, and during his teens he worked as a guide for foreign tourists to Hangzhou.

Jack Ma | Biography & Facts | Britannica

Ma failed the entrance exam for the Hangzhou Teachers College twice. His weak point was mathematics. In , he founded his first company, the Haibo Translation Agency, which provided English translation and interpretation. On a trip to the United States on behalf of the Hangzhou city government in , Ma had his first encounter with the Internet and saw the lack of Chinese Web sites as a great business opportunity.

He left the company two years later, however, partly because of strong competition from the communications company Hangzhou Telecom, which had founded a rival company, Chinesepage. He felt, however, that if he remained with the government, he would miss out on the economic opportunities that the Internet was bringing. Ma persuaded his team at the ministry to go back to Hangzhou with him and found the Alibaba Group, which launched a Web site that facilitated deals between small businesses.

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  • Ma was convinced that the small-business-to-small-business Internet market had much greater potential for growth than the business-to-consumer Internet market had. Small businesses paid a membership fee to be certified as trustworthy sellers on Alibaba, with a greater fee being charged to businesses that wished to sell to customers outside China.

    Growth was rapid; in Alibaba attracted the attention of the American Internet portal Yahoo! These actors, ranging from state and provincial government officials, to corporate executives, to local authorities such as traffic departments , have a stake in the specific contextualisation and design of a complex digital product such as City Brain.

    In this context, Hangzhou was a highly specific and contingent setting for experimental smart platform urbanism. Its specific configuration in the national landscape, its connection to national digital economy agendas, and its highly localised configuration of relationality between city government and technology firms such as Alibaba was key to performing City Brain. At the same time, the same mechanisms which enabled City Brain to be developed and trialled as an experiment in Hangzhou also dynamically change so as to be context-specific in other cities within and outside China, from Chongqing to Kuala Lumpur and in between.

    Again, this highlights the geographical contingency, relationality and co-production that contributed to the materialisation of City Brain outside Hangzhou. Analysis of the co-production of digital urban platforms such as City Brain helps to extend current critiques of digital and smart urbanism that have tended to focus on examples of corporate-led products being applied within cities with little participation from local city governments. It is therefore key to consider the dynamic interrelationship, and associated strengths and weaknesses, of both corporate and government spheres in smart and platform urbanism.

    Secondly, territorialisation went hand in hand with experimentation. City Brain responded, from its first iteration, to the needs and requirements of Hangzhou as the first urban site where the platform was to be trialled. Hangzhou effectively functioned as both a laboratory, and as a field site Evans The city was, essentially, a controlled environment where City Brain could be tested, assessed, modified and if circumstances warranted halted.

    It is in this sense that it can be understood as a laboratory. Nonetheless, as a system reliant on Big Data, City Brain was also predicated on the treatment of Hangzhou as a field site, from where data, and the reality of urban life, could be analysed and eventually partially steered. Concurrently, experimental success could then justify the marketing of the City Brain product to other Chinese cities, and abroad: this is where urban experimentation connects not just with the broader adoption of innovation, but with the material processes of territorialisation of the smart city.

    This leads to a third reflection, focused on the fact that locality was part of the founding driver for a product that was eventually meant to be widely sold to other urban jurisdictions. This points to the importance of local urban context in co-producing digital urban platforms and other smart urban systems. City Brain was a negotiated platform that, because of its co-production by state and corporate actors, was firmly rooted in a specific city context. Furthermore, the importance of the local, specific urban context was not only confined to Hangzhou City Brain, but was crucial in the marketing of the platform, and its adoption, by other cities in China and abroad.

    This finding extends current knowledge on smart city products, by highlighting the importance of a co-produced local urban context in the development of smart cities. While much of the literature has been criticised for its aspatial focus, the City Brain example highlights the importance of a complex pattern of local priorities and urban contexts in the development of data-enabled urbanism.

    Fourth, the relational perspective is a particularly useful contribution to studies of the Chinese smart city. This is because a potential bias in this paper is that of reifying key state and corporate actors, with recourse to oft-repeated tropes that stereotype Chinese urban and political development as hegemonic Wang Rather, we argue, the Chinese smart and platform city can be seen as the result of a more dynamic, relational process involving multiple state, corporate, and hybrid actors in the co-production of projects that may be represented as stable, but that are by no means monolithic or not open to change.

    At the same time, focusing on a relational, co-produced view of the city allows for a potential sidestepping of the instrumental, paternalistic and pragmatic views of the smart city, and for the opening up of a space for debate of ideals beyond techno-economic and other imperatives Cardullo and Kitchin It is true, however, that some of the experience of the smart and platform city is accessible by urban dwellers through smartphones, apps, and other platform devices.

    It is key to critically debate the digital economies and social networking interactions available in the platform city. The progressive potential, and dystopian gateways, offered through such a view of the relational platform city are becoming clear Allam et al. Here, we underline the fact that experimenting with relational and co-produced urban platform projects carries with it the key socio-political and ideological responsibilities and consequences of enmeshing specific, diverse types of relationality into the urban fabric.

    Fifth, while our paper was not a comparative study in empirical terms, some of our findings can be generalizable outside the Chinese urban context. While the way in which City Brain was developed in Hangzhou was clearly contingent on the specific urban setting within which the project emerged, at the same time it can be argued that the design of future urban digital strategies and projects needs to be considered at the same time as local context. Furthermore, although the ways in which relationality, co-production and territorialisation may work outside Hangzhou and indeed outside China may differ, the paper offers a framework for considering the materialisation of platform urbanism by focusing on these three key factors.

    This is because it is apparent that it is the interaction between these aspects that helps to materialise the future digital city, although its shape may differ depending on geographical contingency. Finally, our study points to three pathways for future research. Based on our exploration of territorialisation above, our first direction for future research is focused on the scale and granularity of enquiry into the platform city.

    As Gardner and Hespanhol have argued, while the metropolis and community are key scales at which smart city projects are operationalised, the individual dimension also needs to be considered. Indeed, it is at the level of the individual, and of the personalisation of the smart and platform city experience, that future research could begin to engage with the way s in which digitally-mediated cities construct specific notions of urban citizenship.

    It is clear that platforms such as City Brain perform citizens as participants in an urban experiment through their provision of data, patterns of economic, transport, and other activity, and response to governance inputs through, for example, smart citizen cards and apps. A key question, then, is the extent to which integration of the citizen into these systems through smartphone interfaces and other products, including wearable and health technologies changes what it means to be a citizen in the data-enabled city.

    Secondly, and building on the above, there is ample scope for researching the role of the urban citizen in the new platform city , in China and beyond.

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    This point is based on the absence, rather than presence, of citizens from the planning of many smart urban development projects globally. In the specific case of City Brain, it could be argued that citizens were, to some extent, silent in the process of experimental co-production. Without citizens on which the various technologies could be trialled, and without citizens on whom sensor systems were reliant for mostly passive data inputs, the City Brain experiment would have remained static and unanimated.